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FIDELITY, INDETERMINACY, AND THE
PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL
Michael J. Klarman*
INTRODUCTION

PROESSOR Balkin contends that the principal problem posed for
fidelity is that of "constitutional evil."' That is, how can the Constitution deserve our fidelity when it "is either unjust or permits and
gives legal sanction to serious injustices"-for example, the original
Constitution's support for the institution of slavery? 2 Having thus diagnosed fidelity's main problem, Balkin argues that fidelity's principal
vice is its insidious "psychological and sociological" effect on the constitutional faithful. 3 Specifically, Balkin believes that constitutional fidelity forces us to think about questions of justice in terms of
confining constitutional "concepts and categories."4 Moreover, in order to reduce "cognitive dissonance," fidelity induces us to suppress
recognition of those serious injustices that plainly are beyond the
Constitution's reach.5
I believe that Balkin has misdiagnosed the fundamental problem of
constitutional fidelity, which is one of indeterminacy, not evil. Indeed,
it is the relative indeterminacy of the constitutional text that largely
mitigates any problem of constitutional evil; why interpret the Constitution to safeguard an evil practice when it is so easy to construe it
otherwise? Balkin's diagnostic error, in turn, leads him to exaggerate
the deleterious psychological consequences of constitutional fidelity in
an unjust world. After attempting to establish these points, I shall
briefly sketch out what is for me the principal problem of constitutional fidelity-the nonexistence of any viable middle ground between
the deadhand problem of originalist constitutional interpretation and
the judicial subjectivity problem of nonoriginalist interpretation.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL

Balkin rightly observes that "[w]ithin our legal culture the idea of
fidelity to the Constitution is seen as pretty much an unquestioned
good." 6 The problem for fidelity, according to Balkin, is how to confront the possibility of constitutional evil-the Constitution's respon* Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
1. J.M. Balkdn, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 Fordham

L. Rev. 1703, 1706 (1997).
2. Id.
3. Id at 1703.
4. Id at 1704.
5. d
6. Id
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sibility "for serious injustices."'7 One solution, which Balkin considers
but then largely rejects, is "interpretive conformation"-that is, the
practice of "conforming the Constitution to our ideas of justice."8
Through this practice, we create for ourselves an "ideal Constitution,"
distinguishable from the "past interpretations of the Constitution and
past actions done in the name of the Constitution," and thus avoid the
problem of constitutional evil.9
Balkin largely rejects this approach for two reasons. First, "the
Constitution is not merely a document," but also a "cultural and political tradition" with "doctrinal glosses"; we cannot escape this tradition, which "weighs on us, even if we do not feel its weight."' 10
Second, the Constitution's "abstract ideas," such as liberty and equality, are "historically embedded" concepts, which have had "ideological" and "legitimating" functions; ignoring that aspect of the
Constitution is "hiding one's head in the sand."" For these two reasons, Balkin believes that "interpretive conformation" at best can only
partially solve the problem of constitutional evil.
I believe that Balkin significantly understates the malleability of the
Constitution. American constitutional history reveals an almost limitless creativity among lawyers and statesmen in construing the Constitution to serve their particularistic purposes, thus enabling them to
avoid confrontation with the problem of constitutional evil. The historical example that drives Balkin's paper-slavery-is quite unrepresentative in this regard. The Constitution is a model of clarity on the
slavery question, at least in comparison with most controverted issues
in American constitutional history. Several constitutional provisions
plainly secure the institution of slavery, 2 and no reasonable observer
at the time of the Founding would have believed that Congress possessed a delegated power to interfere with slavery in existing states. 13
Thus, it is unsurprising that most northern opponents of slavery did4
not feel free to question the institution's constitutional status.'
Drawing general lessons about the Constitution's relative determinacy
7. Id at 1706.
8. Id at 1704.

9. Id at 1709.

10. Id at 1711-12.
11. Id at 1712-14.
12. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("three-fifths" clause for apportioning the House of
Representatives); id at art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (temporary ban on congressional interference
with the foreign slave trade); id at art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("fugitive slave clause").
13. See James Oakes, "The Compromising Expedient": Justifying a Proslavery
Constitution, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 2023, 2025 (1996) (James Madison); id. at 2035
(Charles Pinckney); id. at 2045 (Tench Coxe).
14. FirstInaugural Address, in 2 Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 215,
215-16 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989); Republican Party Platform of 1860 § 4, reprinted in National Party Platforms 1840-1972, at 31, 32 (Donald B. Johnson & Kirk
H. Porter eds., 5th ed. 1973); see Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its
Significance in American Law and Politics 548 (1978) [hereinafter Fehrenbacher,
Dred Scott]; David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis 1848-1861, at 423, 532, 550 (1976).
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from its slavery provisions is risky business, though, as a quick canvass
of constitutional history reveals.
Although the antebellum Constitution was understood plainly to
protect slavery in existing states from congressional interference,
there was no similar consensus on the Constitution's ramifications for
congressional power over slavery in the federal territories. By the
1850s, all of the dominant policy positions on this question had been
converted into constitutional interpretations. Most southerners believed that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause protected slavery in the territories from congressional interference (John C.
Calhoun's "common property" doctrine). Republicans argued that
the very same Due Process Clause required Congress to bar slavery
from the territories, because slavery was a denial of "liberty" (the
"free soil" position). Northern Democrats argued that Congress was
barred from resolving the slavery-in-the-territories issue one way or
the other because of the limited scope of its Article IV power to govern the territories (Stephen A. Douglas's "popular sovereignty" position). Apparently, the only constitutional position without significant
support by the 1850s was the one most plausibly attributable to the
Constitution's framers-that Congress had the power, but not the obligation, to forbid slavery in the federal territories. So much for constitutional determinacy!' 5
One can illustrate this point about constitutional malleability with a
seemingly infinite variety of examples. Southerners by 1860 generally
believed that secession was a constitutional right; virtually all
northerners disagreed. 16 The Constitution has been interpreted at
times to bar wealth redistribution; other times it has been construed to
permit or even (qualifiedly) to require the same." At times the Constitution has permitted de jure racial segregation; more recently it has
not.' Poll taxes used to be perfectly constitutional-not any longer. 9
The Equal Protection Clause was interpreted for most of its history to
deny equality claims based on sex or sexual orientation; this has

15. For the doctrines discussed in this paragraph, see Fehrenbacher, Dred Scott,
supra note 14, 152-87; Robert R. Russel, Constitutional Doctrines with Regard to Slavery in Territories,32 J.S. Hist. 466 (1966).
16. See Jesse T. Carpenter, The South as a Conscious Minority, 1789-1861, at 20013 (1930); Potter, supra note 14, at 479-84.
17. See, eg., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (approving wealth
redistribution as a "public purpose"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring the state to pay for defense counsel of indigents in all felony cases); Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (denying the constitutional permissibility of state redistributive ends).
18. Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19. Compare Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) with Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
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changed dramatically in recent years. 20 Not that long ago, legislative
malapportionment was deemed to be a nonjusticiable political question; since the early 1960s, the Court not only has intervened, but has
applied a stringent rule of one person, one vote.2 ' The Justices
changed their minds within a twenty-year period as to whether indigent defendants in noncapital cases were entitled to state-appointed
counsel. 2 It took less than a decade for the Court to change its mind
as to whether a compulsory flag salute violated the First Amendment' or whether a political party's racial restrictions on membership
violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 4 The meaning of the "commerce" power has been revolutionized in the twentieth century, without a constitutional amendment,2 as have the meanings of the
Contract,26 Due Process,2 7 and Free Speech Clauses.'
Many more examples might be cited, but the point seems evident:
the principal constraints on constitutional interpretation derive from
social and political context, not from constitutional text or tradition.
Thus it is no mystery why few people are preoccupied with the problem of constitutional evil. If the Constitution plausibly can be invoked
on either side of most contemporary public policy debates, why would
disputants create needless cognitive dissonance for themselves by conceding the existence of a gap between their constitutional interpretations and their views of social justice? The real problem of fidelity is
not constitutional evil, but rather constitutional indeterminacy-a
point to which I shall return shortly.
Balkin understates the malleability of the Constitution because he
overstates the constraining force of constitutional tradition. Balkin is
20. Compare Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (sex) with Bradwell v. Illinois, 83

U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873); Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (sexual orientation) with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
21. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.

186 (1962) with Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
22. Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) with Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942).

23. Compare West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
with Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
24. Compare Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) with Grovey v. Townsend,
295 U.S. 45 (1935).

25. Compare Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) and United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941) with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) and Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).

26. Compare Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) with
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).

27. Compare West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (economic substantive due process) with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporation of the Bill of Rights) with Twining v. New Jersey, 211

U.S. 78 (1908); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (substantive due process
right to privacy) with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
28. Compare, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) with
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919).
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right to note that constitutional interpretation is constrained; not any
interpretation is plausible at any particular point in time. No court is
about to hold in 1997 that animal rights are protected under the Equal
Protection Clause. Balkin, however, does not adequately consider the
possibility that the boundaries on plausible constitutional interpretation are set more by the social and political context than by constitutional traditions. Brown v. Board of Education29 became a plausible
interpretation of equal protection in 1954 because a host of political,
economic, social, and ideological forces inaugurated or accelerated by
World War II were impelling the nation toward more egalitarian racial
norms.30 The interpretive constraints imposed by constitutional tradition were burst asunder by these exigent extralegal forces. 31 The women's movement and the gay rights movement likewise experienced
relatively little difficulty surmounting obstacles posed by constitutional tradition
once social mores had shifted sufficiently in their
32
direction.
Because social mores usually evolve incrementally, great departures
in constitutional tradition generally are not required to convert positions in contemporary public policy disputes into plausible constitutional claims. For example, as social mores grew increasingly tolerant
of contraceptive use in the post-World War II era, it became possible
for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut33 to constitutionalize such a
right on a limited basis; the Court relied, inter alia, on Skinner v.
Oklahoma,34 which itself had reflected changing social attitudes toward procreation rights. 35 Then, as the burgeoning women's movement spawned increased public support for abortion access, the Court
in Roe v. Wade36 could build upon the Griswold precedent in con29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Chang and the Civil Rights Move-

ment, 80 Va. L. Rev. 7, 13-71 (1994) [hereinafter Klarman, Racial Change].
31. I do not deny that several of the justices in Brown entertained doubts about
jettisoning traditional constitutional concepts such as original intent and precedent; in
the end, though, those doubts were unanimously overcome. See Michael J. Klarman,
Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It Matter?, 83 Geo. LJ. 433, 43646 (1994). But see Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law- Thurgood Marshall
and the Supreme Court, 1936-1961, at 187-95, 194 (1994) (arguing that the justices in
Brown were simply "talking through their concerns about what they knew they were
going to do").

32. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Departures from constitutional tradition may be more
easily accomplished when the Court's decision simply constitutionalizes a dominant

national consensus and deploys it against a local outlier. Griswold certainly fits this
description, as do many of the Court's celebrated "countermajoritarian" interventions. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1996).
34. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating an Oklahoma statute authorizing the sterilization of recidivist criminals).
35. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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structing a constitutional right to abortion.3 7 As the gay rights movement gained social legitimacy soon thereafter, those Justices
sympathetic to the cause had Roe available as a doctrinal building
block for establishing a substantive due process right to private, consensual, adult sexual relations.38 It seems unlikely that the Court's
rejection of such a right in Bowers v. Hardwick 9 was more attributable to the constraining effect of constitutional tradition than to the
conservative predispositions of a majority of Burger Court Justices situated within the social and political context of 1986. With the passage
of an additional decade in which the gay rights movement was able to
broaden and deepen support for its cause, constitutional tradition
failed to inhibit the Court in Romer v. Evans40 from ignoring Bowers
and protecting gay rights on the basis of some creative doctrinal adjustment.4 ' Thus, while Balkin is right that constitutional interpretation is constrained, he is wrong to locate the principal source of that
constraint in constitutional "concepts and categories" rather than in
the contemporary social and political context. What this means is that
constitutional interpretation with regard to seriously contested contemporary policy issues is relatively unconstrained.
The crux of Balkin's contribution is his analysis of the deleterious
"psychological and sociological" consequences of constitutional fidelity in an unjust world. He emphasizes two such effects. First, fidelity
"requires us to speak and think" in language of "constitutional tradition and its characteristic concepts and categories,"42 thus creating "a
sort of tunnel vision"4 3 or "servitude"" by artificially constricting the
ways in which we think about questions of social justice. Second, because "fidelity to the Constitution cannot be jettisoned,""5 and because "[o]ur fidelity to the Constitution requires us to believe that it is
a basically good and just document, ' 46 we suppress any possible "cognitive dissonance" by treating injustices not plausibly addressed by the
4' 7
Constitution as "not seriously and profoundly great injustices.
Although both of these proffered consequences of fidelity are plausible, their significance strikes me as marginal at best. We already have
explored the reason why: the Constitution's malleability permits dis37. Id. at 152-55.
38. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199, 204-06 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
39. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
40. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
41. The doctrinal creativity of Romer is deftly explored in Louis M. Seidman,

Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 Sup.
Ct. Rev. (forthcoming 1997).
42. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1727.
43. Id at 1726.

44. Id
45. Id at 1731.
46. Id at 1729.
47. Id at 1732.
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putants on either side of most controverted policy issues to invoke the
Constitution on their behalf. This point requires some elaboration.
Balkin is concerned that constitutional fidelity artificially constrains
our thinking about injustice by forcing us into "characteristic concepts
and categories .... [when] it is by no means clear that everything
worth saying about justice and injustice can be said in this language." 48 But the many examples of constitutional malleability noted
above would seem to belie this concern. Our constitutional history
reveals that most challenges to widely-perceived injustices have been
rendered plausible, and often successful, under the Constitution. It is
true that success often has come slowly. Yet the relaxed pace at which
constitutional interpretations change is more plausibly attributable to
the incremental nature of social evolution than to the inhibitory effect
49
of traditional concepts and categories on constitutional argument.
Balkin offers just one concrete example to illustrate his point, and it
is unpersuasive. He criticizes "the manner in which the concept of
equal protection has been formalized into questions of fundamental
' 50
right, suspect classification, substantial burden and tiers of scrutiny.
This formal doctrine, Balkin contends, "forms a procrustean bed that
fails to do justice" and indeed "seems to be more a method of promoting social inequality."'" One might respond to Balkin by questioning
the extent to which equal protection doctrine really has constrained
the constitutional decisionmaking of the United States Supreme
Court.
For starters, it is noteworthy that the Court has extended equal protection coverage to many new groups in the last quarter century,
notwithstanding strong arguments to the contrary grounded in "the
constitutional tradition and its characteristic concepts and categories." 52 Women, aliens, nonmarital children, and homosexuals have
come to enjoy significant constitutional protection as social mores
53
have changed and constitutional concepts have adjusted accordingly.
The Equal Protection Clause has become home not only to new
48. Id. at 1727.
49. When social mores change quickly, as during wartime, so does constitutional

interpretation. Compare, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624,638 (1943) (flag salute) with Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (white primary) with Grovey v. Townsend, 295
U.S. 45 (1935). When social mores change more slowly, so does constitutional interpretation. Compare, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial segregation) with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(sex discrimination) with Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
50. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1728.

51. Id. For a similar sort of claim, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

52. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1727.
53. E.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996) (homosexuals); Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259 (1978) (nonmarital children); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (women);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (aliens).

1746

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

groups but also to new rights during this period. With scarcely a deferential nod toward constitutional tradition, the Court has interpreted
the Equal Protection Clause to guarantee access to the criminal justice
system, the franchise, the right to travel, and more.54 Furthermore,
even during an era in which the Court rhetorically invokes the doctrinal structure Balkin laments, numerous cases evince the Justices' willingness to elide the doctrine when it prescribes results in tension with
their visceral sense of fairness. The results in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,55 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center,56 Plyler v. Doe,57 and Romer suggest that the Justices' intuitions about fairness drive constitutional decisionmaking more than do
characteristic concepts and categories. 58 To be sure, the Court, invoking traditional doctrinal concepts, sometimes rejects equal protection
claims that seem meritorious to many observers.5 9 Yet it is difficult to
know whether such results indeed are attributable, as Balkin would
have it, to the stultifying effect of traditional doctrine, or rather to the
more conservative (Burger) Court's lack of sympathy for the underlying equality claim or its greater commitment to the principle of legislative deference.
Balkin identifies a second harmful psychological consequence of
constitutional fidelity in an unjust world. This is the pressure people
feel to regard injustices not plausibly addressed by the Constitution as
relatively insignificant, in order to reduce the cognitive dissonance
that would result from acknowledging that we show fidelity to a document that is not "basically good and just. ' 60 Here, again, the plausibility of Balkin's claim depends on his premise that the Constitution is
not sufficiently malleable to bear interpretations responsive to (virtu54. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (franchise); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(criminal process).
55. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
56. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
57. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
58. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado
constitutional amendment that barred state and local political processes from extending any "protected status" based on sexual orientation); Cleburne,473 U.S. at 450
(invalidating a zoning ordinance that required special use permits for construction of
a group home for the mentally disabled); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (invalidating a Texas
policy denying free public education to children of illegal aliens); Moreno, 413 U.S. at
538 (invalidating a provision of the federal food stamp program excluding from participation households containing unrelated individuals).
59. E.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to age discrimination on the ground that age is
not a suspect classification); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to unequal funding of school districts on
the ground that wealth is not a suspect classification and education is not a fundamental right).
60. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1729. Mike Seidman has made a similar sort of claim
about two of the Court's most famous constitutional decisions. See Louis M. Seidman,
Brown and Miranda, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 673 (1992).
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ally) all evils perceived as such by a substantial portion of the population. Yet it seems likely that the reason the Constitution inspires the
"idolatry"61 which Balkin warns against is because it represents all
things to all people. The Constitution's meaning is sufficiently indeterminate that both the North and the South claimed the fundamental
charter on their side during the Civil War;' little had changed a hundred years later as the Justices confronted the School Desegregation
Cases.63 Likewise, does the Constitution bar wealth redistribution, or
permit it, or perhaps even require it? The Court has ruled differently
at different times,' and even today leading commentators cannot
agree.6" It would appear that the examples of constitutional indeterminacy noted above render Balkin's claim suspect. The examples he
himself invokes suggest that he plainly is wrong.
Balkin's principal example of this "legitimation" phenomenon involves contemporary attitudes toward the problem of poverty.' One
important reason people today seem less worried than previously
about the poor, Balkin argues, is their perception that the Constitution has nothing to say on the subject. In order to reduce the cognitive dissonance that would flow from acknowledging that the
Constitution tolerates fundamental evil, Balkin contends, people face
psychological pressure to regard poverty as only a minor injustice. I
think Balkin's account must be mistaken for two reasons.
First, for most of this nation's first two centuries, the Constitution
was understood to bar some forms of wealth redistribution67 and not
to require any.68 Yet in the 1960s, America briefly became committed
61. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1730.
62. See James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 239-40,
246-47 (1988).
63. Southerners after Brown reaffirmed their "reliance on the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the land," while denouncing the Court's decision as a "clear abuse
of judicial power" because the Constitution consistently had been interpreted to permit racial segregation. See 102 Cong. Rec. 4515-16 (1956) (Southern Manifesto).
64. See supra note 17.
65. Compare Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Forward: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L Rev. 7 (1969)
with Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution,
1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 695 and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality,and the
Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41.
66. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1732-33. For a similar sort of argument, see Charles
W. McCurdy, The "Liberty of Contract" Regime in American Law, in Freedom of
Contract and the State (Harry N. Scheiber ed., forthcoming 1998).
67. E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating a statutory ban on
yellow dog contracts and declaring that the state cannot have wealth redistribution as
its objective); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (striking
down a national income tax as a direct, unapportioned tax); Sturges v. Crowninshield,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) (invalidating a debtor relief law under the contract
clause).
68. Among the first instances in which the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution to require the state to subsidize the poor were Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932), holding that a state must provide counsel to indigent defendants in capital
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to a war on poverty, and the Supreme Court, also briefly, was drawn
along in its wake.6 9 How could the nation have come to perceive the
maldistribution of wealth as a great evil if, for nearly two centuries,
the Constitution was understood either to permit or to require it? In
Balkin's view, the need to reduce cognitive dissonance should have
impelled Americans to regard wealth inequality as a trivial problem
rather than a grave injustice.
Second, it is unclear why Balkin believes that mandatory wealth redistribution would be an "off-the-wall" 70 constitutional argument today. It is vital to Balkin's claim that it be so, for otherwise people
would face no psychological pressure to downplay the significance of
poverty; cognitive dissonance, Balkin explains, flows only from the belief that the Constitution cannot plausibly be interpreted to reach a
grave injustice. By the late 1960s, however, the Supreme Court already had mandated mild forms of wealth redistribution and, in the
view of many observers, was on the verge of requiring a good deal
more. 7 1 The Justices had intimated the existence of a constitutional
right to welfare, 72 suggested that wealth, like race, was a suspect classification, 73 and constitutionally required the state in a few contexts to
subsidize the constitutional rights of the indigent. 74 Lower federal
courts, urged on by numerous constitutional commentators,75 had
pushed even farther in this direction, declaring the existence of consticases, and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), holding that a state must provide free
trial transcripts, or a reasonable alternative, to criminal defendants appealing their
convictions.
69. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating durational residency requirements for welfare); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (invalidating poll tax requirement for voting in state elections).
70. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1729.

71. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 65, at 42 (asserting that by 1969 the "champions of
judicial activism had gathered their forces for a constitutional assault on the distribution of income"); see also Martin Shapiro, Fathersand Sons: The Court, the Commentators and the Search for Values, in The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That

Wasn't 218, 219 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (suggesting that a faction of the Warren
Court, although not clearly a majority, was moving toward constitutionalizing minimum levels of subsistence, housing, and education).
72. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618.

73. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (stating
that wealth and race are "two factors which would independently render a classification highly suspect"); Harper,383 U.S. at 668 ("Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or

property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored." (citations omitted)).
74. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (access fees for divorce court);
Harper,383 U.S. 663 (poll taxes); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (stateprovided counsel for indigent defendants' appeals); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (state-provided counsel for indigent defendants' felony trials); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (state-provided trial transcripts for indigent defendants'
appeals).

75. E.g., Harold W. Horowitz, Unseparatebut Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth
Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 UCLA L. Rev. 1147 (1966);
Michelman, supra note 65; Lawrence G. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary
Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 767 (1969).
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tutional rights to welfare and to equal educational funding across
school districts. 6
Then the Warren Court came to an abrupt end in 1969 with the
departures of Justice Fortas and Chief Justice Warren. The Burger
Court immediately and decisively halted these incipient developments.77 For present purposes, however, the key points are that the
constitutional arguments for wealth redistribution were succeeding,
that they continued to attract significant support in dissenting opinions by Warren Court holdovers, 78 and that they easily could be resurrected once public opinion becomes more hospitable to the cause. To
the extent that constitutional arguments for redistribution seem farfetched today, it is because of the changed social and political context,
not anything in the nature of the constitutional text or traditional constitutional doctrine. Would it not be odd if the Supreme Court discovered a constitutional right to welfare just as Congress begins
dismantling the modem welfare state? Yet because constitutional arguments for wealth redistribution were taken seriously so recently, it
is hard to see why they should be regarded as doctrinally "off-thewall." And so long as redistributive arguments are constitutionally
plausible, acknowledging that poverty is a serious injustice creates no
cognitive dissonance.
Balkin's other principal example confirms that his legitimation
point is either marginal or simply wrong. A general consensus existed
in antebellum politics that the Constitution insulated slavery in the
existing states from congressional interference.7 9 Yet the fact that abolition plainly was understood by mainstream opinion to be constitutionally "out of bounds" did not induce most people to regard slavery
as only a minor injustice. On the contrary, by the 1850s slavery had
become the nation's dominant political and moral issue, with most
northerners committed to limiting the institution's spread, while conceding that the Constitution prevented Congress from interfering with
slavery in the states where it already existed.80 Lincoln, who consist76. On welfare, see, e.g., Kaiser v. Montgomery, 319 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Cal. 1970)
(three-judge court); Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968) (threejudge court), rev'd, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). On educational funding, see, e.g., Van
Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (three-judge court) (per curiam),
rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
77. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973) (rejecting
constitutional challenge to unequal funding of school districts); United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434, 443 (1973) (rejecting constitutional challenge to filing fees for bankruptcy court); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141-43 (1971) (denying that wealth is a
suspect classification); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (denying that
welfare is a fundamental right).
78. E.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge,397 U.S.
at 508 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. See supra notes 13-14.
80. See McPherson, supra note 62, at 117-69; Potter, supra note 14.
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ently conceded that Congress could not abolish slavery in the states,
nonetheless insisted that "slavery is an unqualified evil." 81 One cannot show conclusively that Balkin is mistaken in his belief that the
need to reduce cognitive dissonance impels us to discount the gravity
of injustices not plausibly redressable by the Constitution. But certainly the course of antebellum politics on the slavery issue does nothing to corroborate his claim.8
Indeed if Balkin's legitimation point is of more than marginal significance, it is difficult to understand how any social movement challenging the political and constitutional status quo succeeds. If ever a
constitutional claim was "out of bounds," it was, until the last decade
or two, that of gays and lesbians seeking anti-discrimination coverage
under the Equal Protection Clause. Yet the psychological imperative
to reduce cognitive dissonance by treating injustices not plausibly addressed by the Constitution as relatively insignificant apparently has
not inhibited the creation of a robust gay rights movement. Precisely
the same point applies to the women's movement. The fact that nobody in the early twentieth century plausibly could claim that the
Constitution required women's suffrage did not inhibit the creation of
a mass public movement demanding that reform. Examples easily
might be multiplied, but the point appears evident. Even if there is
something to Balkin's legitimation point-and I think there is something to it-he surely overstates its effect. Fidelity's most significant
vice is not its deleterious psychological and sociological effects on the
constitutional faithful.
Balkin's principal claim apparently locates him within a larger
school of thought that emphasizes the symbolic or educational effect
of Supreme Court decisions.13 This body of scholarship tends to emphasize the obverse of Balkin's position: when the Supreme Court
holds that the Constitution does condemn a particular practice, public
opinion is educated in a positive direction. Most notably, conventional wisdom holds that Brown had a significant influence of this
sort.' Yet the accuracy of this claim regarding the educational or
81. E.g., Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Edwardsville, Illinois, in 1 Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings, supra note 14, at 580, 581-82; see also Abraham Lincoln's Reply in the Seventh Lincoln-Douglas Debate, in 1 Abraham Lincoln:
Speeches and Writings, supra note 14, at 807-08 (observing that the great difference
between Democrats and Republicans is that only the latter regard slavery as "a moral,
social and political wrong").

82. In addition, to the extent that northerners were prepared to make concessions
regarding slavery, it probably was their fidelity to the Union rather than the need to
suppress cognitive dissonance that induced them to minimize the injustice of the institution. See, e.g., R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman
of the Old Republic 377-78 (1985).
83. E.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Courtan Educative Institution?,
67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 961 (1992).

84. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing
of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 Va. L. Rev. 151, 152-53 (1994); C. Herman Pritch-
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symbolic effect of Supreme Court decisions is as contestable as
Balkin's obverse contention.
First, it is not obvious that even Brown had a dramatic effect of this
sort. Note that this causal claim is different from the one that Brown
inspired blacks to press their civil rights grievances in court. AfricanAmericans fully appreciated the injustice of Jim Crow without
Supreme Court instruction; Brown simply made it clear that lawsuits
challenging segregation were now likely to be victorious.' Rather the
claim about Brown's educational influence is principally one regarding
its effect on white opinion. And here the historical record is far more
ambiguous than conventional wisdom would have it. In the South,
Brown, if anything, crystallized southern resistance to changing the
racial status quo.8 6 In the nation as a whole, opinion polls conducted
in the years after Brown registered only minor movement in attitudes
toward racial segregation-a gradual shift in opinion that plausibly
could be attributable to political, social, economic, and ideological
trends inaugurated or accelerated by World War II as much as to
Brown.87
There is little reason to believe that Supreme Court decisions in
politically controversial cases often have the sort of legitimizing effect
that Balkin implicitly, and others explicitly, ascribe to them; indeed,
there is some reason to believe that Court decisions have precisely the
opposite effect. Scott v. Sandford8 hardly convinced Republicans that
their party was, as the Court had declared it to be, built upon an unconstitutional platform; if anything, the decision probably converted
at least some additional northerners to the Republican cause. 89 Today's conventional understanding of Roe v. Wade90 is that, far from
reconciling abortion opponents to a woman's fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy, the decision actually spawned a right-to-life opposition which did not previously exist.9 Fimaliy, is it plausible to
believe that any substantial number of gay and lesbian Americans (or
other supporters of their rights) came to question the morality of their
ett, Equal Protectionand the Urban Majority, 58 Am. PoL Si. Rev. 869, 869 (1964);

Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 Va. L Rev. 173,
175-77 (1994).
85. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and Political
Correctness,80 Va. L. Rev. 185, 187-89 (1994).

86. See Klarman, Racial Change, supra note 30, at 75-150.
87. See id at 78.
88. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
89. See Fehrenbacher, Dred Scott, supra note 14, at 561-67 (concluding that the
combination of Dred Scott and the furor raised over the Lecompton Constitution
probably explains the momentous Republican gains in the lower North between 1856
and 1858, which ultimately enabled Lincoln to win the presidency in 1860).
90. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

91. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 354-59 (1994); Gerald N.
Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 188, 341-42
(1991); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a JudicialVoice, 67 N.Y.U. L Rev. 1185,
1205 (1992).
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sexual orientation on the basis of Bowers? On the contrary, I think it
probable that Bowers was one of the most important factors in mobilizing today's gay rights movement.
Whether or not this "backlash thesis" 92 is correct, the case for the
legitimizing effect of Supreme Court decisions (or, obversely, Balkin's
claim for the delegitimizing effect of Supreme Court nondecisions) has
not been established. It is implausible to believe that the nation's apparent relative indifference to poverty in the 1990s is significantly attributable to the Court's refusal to recognize a constitutional right to
wealth redistribution a quarter century ago.
II. THE REAL PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL FIDELITY
The missing variable that causes Balkin to overstate the harmful
psychological consequences of fidelity is, it turns out, also the real
problem of fidelity: the malleability of the constitutional text. Constitutional evil is a minor problem because the Constitution generallyexcept perhaps with regard to slavery-is sufficiently malleable to
permit non-evil interpretations. American constitutional history suggests that almost any practice perceived as unjust by a sufficient percentage of the population eventually will be subjected to a (plausible)
constitutional challenge. Yet herein lies the real problem with constitutional fidelity. If most controversial social issues plausibly can be
converted into constitutional disputes, and the document's text is indeterminate as to how those disputes ought to be resolved, how do we
show fidelity to the Constitution without subjecting ourselves to uncabined judicial rule? Balkin's paper says not a word about the
countermajoritarian difficulty posed by judicial review; yet this is fidelity's principal problem-or at least half of it. The other half is the
deadhand problem of constitutionalism.
The purest form of constitutional fidelity would appear to be some
version of originalism. Yet originalist constitutional interpretation
creates an enormous deadhand problem: why should today's generation be governed by decisions made two hundred years ago by people
who inhabited a radically different world and held radically different
ideas and values? To the extent that originalists bother to defend
their interpretive methodology, they tend to offer a comparative justification: originalism is superior to its most plausible alternative, which
is some form of relatively uncabined judicial value creation. 93 In
other words, originalists often assert that it is antidemocratic for
unelected, remotely accountable judges to invalidate democratically92. See Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash
Thesis, 81 J. Am. Hist. 81 (1994).
93. See Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 283, 288 (1996); Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an "ism", 19
Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 301, 306 (1996); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil,
57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
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enacted legislation on the basis of their own subjective value judgments. 94 One might retort, however, why isn't it equally antidemocratic for a contemporary majority to be governed by values
enshrined in the Constitution over two hundred years ago? That is,
haven't constitutional originalists simply substituted a deadhand problem for a judicial subjectivity problem? 95 Both interpretive methodologies are susceptible to the charge of being antimajoritarian.
Most efforts to locate a middle ground between the polar positions
of deadhand rule and uncabined judicial subjectivity have embraced
some version of a "living Constitution," 96 "moderate originalism," 97
or "translation.19 8 However labeled, the idea is that one can avoid the
vices of both deadhand control and uncabined judicial subjectivity by
taking the Framers' concepts and "translating" them into modern circumstances. The obvious problem wvith the enterprise is one of indeterminacy-doesn't translating old concepts into modern contexts
inevitably implicate the very sort of unconstrained judicial subjectivity
that translation's proponents seek to avoid? I have endeavored elsewhere to show that the answer is "yes"-the translation enterprise is
quite hopeless. 99 To briefly summarize, there are a couple of distinct
problems.
First, translation fails to accomplish its objective of avoiding deadhand control. When we translate old constitutional concepts to accommodate new circumstances, the deadhand problem persists,
because it is always possible that an unconstrained modern decisionmaker would simply conclude that the old concept has outlived its
usefulness. Translators ask, for example, how the Framers' commitment to federalism principles should be adjusted to reflect the reality
94. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction
of the Law 256-59 (1990).

95. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, A NonoriginalistPerspective on the Lessons of His-

tory, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 351, 353 (1996); see also Lino A. Graglia, It's Not
Constitutionalism, It's JudicialActivism, 19 Harv. J.L & Pub. Pol'y 293, 296 (1996)
(observing that constitutionalism raises a deadhand problem and judicial review a
countermajoritarian problem).
96. E.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L.
Rev. 693 (1976) (criticizing the concept).
97. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60
B.U. L. Rev. 204, 205 (1980).
98. E.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L Rev. 1165 (1993);
Lawrence Lessig, UnderstandingChanged Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L
Rev. 395 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, UnderstandingChanged Readings].
Even conservative originalists play this game when doing so is politically imperative, though they like to pretend otherwise. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 94, at 81-82
(seeking to justify Brown by elevating the level of generality at which the intention of
the Fourteenth Amendment's drafters is stated); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism
and the DesegregationDecisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947, 1103-04 (1995) (same).
99. See Michael J. Klarman, Anti-Fidelity, 70 S.Cal. L Rev. (forthcoming Mar.
1997) [hereinafter Klarman, Anti-Fidelity]. For another affirmative answer, see Mark
V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critiqueof Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles,96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 798-804 (1983).

1754

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

of a modem, industrial, highly integrated economy. 00 Perhaps the
right question to ask, however, is whether the Framers would retain
their commitment to federalism at all in light of these radically
changed circumstances. After all, at least some of the Founders embraced federalism less out of political principle than political necessity-that is, the fact that the state legislatures, which could not be
entirely cut out of the Constitution's ratifying process, would be loath
to relinquish too much of their power.' 0 ' This is not to deny that federalism retains many of its virtues even today. For example, it fosters
experimentation, encourages competition between states, arguably
maximizes preference satisfaction in a geographically diverse nation,
enhances citizen participation in government, and ensures the existence of competing governmental power sources: °0 Yet federalism
also has many disadvantages, some of which are simply the flip-sides
of its advantages. Federalism permits races to the bottom, prevents
realization of efficiencies of scale, frustrates efforts to create an economic common market, arguably creates greater opportunities for minority oppression (the converse of Madison's point in FederalistNo.
10) and obstructs implementation of federally-guaranteed rights
(think of massive resistance to Brown). Plainly, balancing the competing virtues and vices of federalism is a complicated enterprise. My
only point here is that freed from the political reality that made federalism commitments unavoidable, and apprised of the massive political,
social, and economic changes that arguably render federalism obsolete, it is entirely plausible that the transplanted Founders would
choose to reject federalism altogether rather than translating it.
Nor does translation solve the problem of uncabined judicial rule.
There are two distinct problems. First, when translating, how do we
know which circumstances to hold constant and which to vary-that
is, when asking what the Framers would have done under modern circumstances, which aspects of their world do we vary and which do we
leave in place? Second, assuming we can answer this question of
which changed circumstances are relevant to the translation, how do
we calculate what the Founders would have done in light of those
changes?
100. E.g., Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995
Sup. Ct. Rev. 125; Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 98.
101. See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making
of the Constitution 162, 169-70 (1996). Madison had to sacrifice many of his nationalist aspirations-the national veto on state laws, the open-ended grant of national legislative power, the constitutional mandate of lower federal courts-to accommodate
political reality.
102. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated
Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 774-84 (1995);
Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1498-99 (1994);

Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudenceof Federalism
After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 341, 380-414.
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Consider first the question of which changed circumstances to incorporate into the translation. A rather large problem immediately
presents itself: If we treat all changed circumstances as relevant variables, then we simply will have converted the Framers into us, and
asking how they would resolve a problem is no different from asking
how we would resolve it. Yet a decision to treat some changed circumstances as variables and others as constants seems entirely arbitrary. For example, it is wholly uncontroversial to vary the existing
state of technology when translating the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. I am aware of nobody who argues that Congress cannot regulate airplanes because they did not exist when the
Constitution was adopted; airplanes are a modem analogue of ships,
so certainly Congress can regulate their interstate movement. Yet in
translating Congress's Commerce Clause power, why is it any less justifiable to treat as relevant variables all of the other changed circumstances that might influence one's attitude toward federalism-for
example, the modem proliferation of national and international markets, the transportation and communications revolutions, the nation's
growing international role, the increased mobility of the American
population, and so forth?
Even if we could agree on which changed circumstances are relevant, we still would need to figure out whether the extent of the
change has been sufficient to justify a translation. For example, Lawrence Lessig has argued that by the 1930s changed circumstancesboth conceptions of the nature of law and political and social variables, the most notable of which was the Great Depression-justified
the Supreme Court's repudiation of the Lochner era's commitment to3
laissez-faire economics and limited national government power."'
Lessig's empirical claim about changed circumstances seems convincing. The pathologies of a complex urban, industrial society plainly did
reduce the allure of laissez-faire and increase support for national
government regulation by the 1930s. Yet a court charged with the
complex task of translating the Framers' intentions needs to know
more than the general direction of changing circumstances; it needs to
identify with precision the point at which those changes have become
sufficient to justify a translation. The problem is that at any particular
point in time, reasonable people will disagree about whether the
change in circumstances has been sufficient to justify a translation of
the Framers' intentions. As late as 1937, the Four Horsemen still had
not spotted sufficient changes in circumstance to justify translation of
laissez-faire and federalism concepts. 104 On the other hand, as early
as 1905-1910 some justices and scholars already had identified suffi103. Lessig, Understanding ChangedReadings, supra note 98, at 443-70.
104. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 76 (1937) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting).
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cient change to warrant a translation. 10 5 Furthermore, it is difficult to
believe that one's view of the sufficiency of changed circumstances
does not reflect, to a substantial degree, one's normative commitments. The Four Horsemen, for example, would have been unconvinced of the sufficiency of changed circumstances in 1937 largely
because they liked things better the old way. 10 6 Measuring the extent
of changed circumstances and assessing whether they are sufficient to
justify a translation are tasks certain to yield controverted conclusions.
One can phrase this in terms of translation-would the Framers have
considered the changed circumstances sufficient to justify altering
their constitutional commitments? Since the answer to that question,
however, is so obviously indeterminate, it appears that the real ground
of controversy is over what we think should be done, rather than over
what the Framers would have done in our changed circumstances.
Translation solves the judicial subjectivity problem no better than it
does the deadhand problem.
CONCLUSION

The real difficulty with fidelity is not that of constitutional evil; the
relative malleability of the Constitution largely eliminates that problem. Rather, the quandary for fidelity is how one can remain faithful
to the Constitution without succumbing to either of the twin pathologies of deadhand rule or judicial rule, neither of which seems like a
particularly attractive way to run a democracy. It is easy to understand the urge to seek a middle ground between these polar pathologies. Yet it turns out that the search is hopeless. Translation does not
work; it eliminates neither the deadhand problem nor that of judicial
subjectivity. The problem of constitutional fidelity is irresolvable.
Perhaps we should reconsider our premises. Is it clear that constitutional fidelity really is such a good thing?' 017 Perhaps we should give
"constitutional adulter[y]' '10 8 a try.
105. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does
not entertain."); Learned Hand, Due Process and the Eight-HourDay, 21 Harv. L.
Rev. 495, 506-07 (1908) (noting changed conceptions of property and contract rights
that allow for greater social regulation); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale
Li. 454, 464 (1909) (criticizing substantive due process decisions as relying on a formalistic conception of law that "contrast[s] with the social conception of the present"); id. at 467 (noting "new conditions in business and industry" of which
legislatures should be able to take account in regulatory legislation).
106. They also may have considered changed circumstances irrelevant to constitutional interpretation. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 44849
(1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) ("A provision of the Constitution... does not
mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at another time.").
107. I have argued against constitutional fidelity in Klarman, Anti-Fidelity, supra
note 99, and explored non-constitutional, majoritarian uses of judicial review in
Michael J. Klarman, MajoritarianJudicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
Geo. LJ.(forthcoming Feb. 1997).
108. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1703.

